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ABSTRACT:  During the period 1965-1987 Spain was an emerging market in full 
transition from developing to developed status. During the same period the Spanish 
banking system underwent an unprecedented episode of   expansion growing from 5,000 
to over 30,000 bank branches. We examine whether the latter process partly caused the 
former by focusing on the relationship between branch expansion and entrepreneurship in 
the wholesale and retail trade industries. To address the non-random allocation of bank 
branches we exploit changes in branching policies that induced a plausibly exogenous 
time-varying pattern in the relationship between a municipality’s initial financial 
development and branch expansion. Our estimates, based on a panel data-set of over 
2,000 Spanish municipalities, reveal that branch expansion had a strong positive impact 
on entrepreneurship. This effect was essentially driven by the savings banks, which have 
stronger regional development objectives than those held by the commercial banks, and 
which expanded more intensely into municipalities with more precarious financial 
services. 
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1. Introduction 
An important channel via which financial development fosters economic development is 
through the modification of occupational choices in favour of entrepreneurship (Banerjee 
and Newman, 1993; Banerjee, 2004). For this reason development economists are 
interested in understanding whether, and if so the extent to which, financial development 
spurs entrepreneurship. A common problem in developing countries is that many people 
have little wealth and, hence, lack the necessary collateral to access the formal banking 
system. A number of papers document the fact that microcredit can in part circumvent this 
problem by alleviating the credit constraints on those excluded from conventional financial 
systems.1 However, microcredit has its own limitations, the most important of which 
perhaps being that it provides small loans (that might be insufficient to finance large scale 
investments) at high interest rates. The ideal situation, it might be argued, would be for 
developing countries to gradually converge to the situation observed in developed 
countries where the vast majority of people have access to the formal credit market.2 What 
would the gains for developing countries be if their formal financial markets converged to 
the levels of development and inclusion observed in developed economies? 
 
We can obtain a satisfactory answer to this question by focusing on Spanish municipalities 
between the years 1965 and 1987, when by far most of the present-day Spanish banking 
system was built. During this period, the number of bank branches grew from 5,000 to 
over 30,000 (representing an increase of almost one branch per thousand inhabitants) and 
the percentage of unbanked municipalities fell from roughly 50% to below 5%.3 This 
notable wave of bank expansion led to a substantial improvement in financial services 
particularly in small rural municipalities that had hitherto been forced to resort to informal 
credit. Coinciding with this enhancement in the country’s level of financial development, 
Spain underwent an extraordinary process of economic and social transformation. At the 
                                                          
1 Randomized evaluations reveal that microcredit expands the scale of existing self-employment activities of 
households in rural areas of Morocco (Crépon et al, 2011) and has positive effects on business creation in 
Hyderabad, India, (Banerjee et al., 2010), but has no effect on business expansion in the Philippines (Karlan 
and Zinman, 2010).  
2 While converging to the levels of financial development observed in developed countries might well seem 
desirable, it should be stressed that credit constraints remain in developed countries. For instance, uneven 
levels of financial development explain differences in entrepreneurship and growth in a cross-section of 
Italian regions (Guiso et al., 2004; Pascali, 2012). Financial development caused by inter-state bank branching 
deregulations in the US caused an increase in startup activity (Black and Strahan, 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan, 
2006; and Kerr and Nanda, 2009). Differences in the supply of venture capital lead to marked differences in 
entrepreneurship across US metropolitan areas (Samila and Sorenson, 2011). 
3 The Spanish financial system is largely bank based (this was particularly true during the period we study) 
which means we can obtain an accurate measure of financial development by simply tracking the deployment 
of bank branches. 
2
  
beginning of our sample period, Spain was a dictatorship that had just abandoned self-
sufficiency in a bid to open up to trade and foreign direct investment, and the country 
presented GDP growth rates that were typical of emerging markets (close to 8%). By the 
end of the eighties, Spain was a democracy and a member of the EU and presented growth 
rates that had fallen to levels more typical of developed economies. We believe this 
environment to be ideal for illustrating the way in which banking development can nudge 
an economy towards economic development. We seek to isolate the effects of bank branch 
expansion in the country’s economic development process by estimating its impact on 
entrepreneurship in the wholesale and retail trade industries (measured as the number of 
commercial licenses per capita).  
 
Measuring the exact impact of bank expansion is a challenging task mainly because 
financial development typically responds to various economic demands. This makes the 
identification of the causal impact of bank branch expansion on entrepreneurship 
problematic. Addressing this reverse causality issue is indeed the main challenge of the 
empirical literature on financial development and growth (Levine, 1997). Spain presents an 
ideal “laboratory” in which to address this issue as the enormous between and within 
variation in branch expansion across Spanish municipalities during the period 1965-1987 
was largely policy driven. This provides us with a credible source of exogenous variation in 
bank branch location decisions.  
 
In 1939, following the Spanish Civil War, the Fascist regime sought to reconstruct the 
financial system by implementing a series of restrictive norms that kept the financial system 
strictly regulated. This regulatory wave ushered in a period extending from 1939 to 1964 
which came to be referred to as the banking status quo. One of the main consequences of 
this status quo was that the number of bank branches barely increased and so financial 
development remained firmly anchored at pre Civil War levels for more than twenty years. 
This was to change between 1964 and 1973 when the Government launched an ambitious 
Banking Expansion Plan aimed at expanding the provision of banking services throughout 
the Spanish territory. The main goal of the program was to address the virtual absence of 
banking services in many municipalities. As a result, the vast majority of branches created 
during the Banking Expansion Plan were opened in municipalities with low levels of initial 
financial development. In August 1974 branching restrictions were totally lifted for 
commercial banks, but only partly lifted for savings banks (who were only permitted to 
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branch within their traditional provinces). This triggered different expansion strategies in 
the commercial and savings banks: so while the former expanded to prosperous locations 
with high initial financial development immediately after 1975, the latter continued to open 
branches primarily in the unbanked municipalities until the beginning of the eighties (when 
their branching restrictions were also further relaxed).  
 
Our identification strategy exploits the policy-driven nature of branch expansion to address 
the likely non randomness of branch locations. We show that between 1965 and 1974, 
while the Banking Expansion Plan was operative, aggregate (commercial and savings) bank 
branch expansion was relatively higher in initially less financially developed municipalities. 
The opposite would be the case between 1975 and 1987 under the liberalized regime. Our 
instruments capture the time-varying pattern between a municipality’s initial financial 
development and bank branch expansion. This strategy remains valid as long as other 
municipality-specific variables with the potential to influence entrepreneurship outcomes 
did not exhibit a similar time-varying pattern with respect to the municipalities’ initial 
financial development. We argue that entrepreneurship-related policies such as regional, 
welfare or road infrastructure policies did not experience such time-varying patterns. Our 
methodology is closely related to that adopted by Burgess and Pande (2005) in their use of 
time breaks in branch expansion across Indian States to estimate the impact of the Indian 
Social Banking Experiment on poverty. 
 
Interestingly, the divergence in the way in which the expansion trajectories taken by the 
commercial and savings banks responded to the municipalities’ initial financial 
development after 1975 enables us to identify the separate effects of the two types of 
banking institution. Commercial banks are purely profit-driven public limited companies, 
while savings banks are private limited companies with much stronger local development 
objectives (their board of directors comprising representatives of local public bodies, i.e., 
the municipalities and autonomous communities). The different nature and objectives of 
commercial and savings banks mean that the latter may well impose less stringent 
conditions on their borrowers, as their primary mission is to facilitate access to loans to 
small and medium-sized enterprises. We test whether savings banks had a stronger impact 
on entrepreneurship.  
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To frame the empirical analysis we use a slightly modified version of Evans and 
Jovanovic’s (1989) model of occupational choice.4 We first examine the individual-level 
decision to enter into entrepreneurship as a function of the financial development 
(understood as increased borrowing possibilities) of the location to which the individual 
belongs. Financial development enhances the individual’s chances of becoming an 
entrepreneur by allowing him to borrow a larger multiple of his wealth up to a point at 
which starting a business may become profitable. We then aggregate over individuals to 
derive an expression that shows that the share of entrepreneurs of a given location is 
positively related with its level of financial development. In short, we use Evans and 
Jovanovic’s (1989) model to motivate an empirical equation similar to those recurrently 
estimated in the literature (and most closely related to our paper) on financial development 
and entrepreneurship (Black and Strahan, 2002; Guiso et al., 2004; Cetorelli and Strahan 
2006; Kerr and Nanda, 2009; Fulford, 2012).5  
 
In this paper we take municipalities as the relevant market for financial development. If the 
inhabitants from a given municipality were able to tap the financial services of 
neighbouring municipalities then our municipality-based definition of credit market 
conditions could be criticized for being too narrow a geographical definition for financial 
development. There are two powerful reasons, however, for using municipalities as our 
relevant market for financial development. First, the Banking Expansion Plan was 
conceived at a municipality level. The reason why the Bank of Spain took municipalities as 
its geographical unit is that road infrastructures were extremely precarious (highways were 
literally absent at the beginning of the period under study) leaving many municipalities 
largely isolated. Second, and related to this point, there is an increasing body of literature 
documenting the fact that distance matters in the provision of funds (Petersen and Rajan, 
2002; Berger et al., 2005; Degryse and Ongena, 2005). In line with the oft-cited statement 
made by the president of the Italian Association of Bankers, and first reported in Guiso et 
al. (2004), “the banker’s rule-of-thumb is to never lend to a client located more than three 
miles from his office”. If this was the case in Spain too (and it is fairly plausible given the 
                                                          
4 This model is at the heart of the empirical literature on wealth and entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic, 
1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Paulson and Townsend, 2004; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). 
5 This is interesting because the literature on financial development and entrepreneurship (or growth) 
descends from a different family of macroeconomic models on financial development and growth 
(Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Goldsmith, 1969; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; King and Levine 1993; 
McKinnon, 1973). Our modified version of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) might thus serve to link two streams 
of related empirical research (those on wealth and entrepreneurship and those on financial development and 
growth) that have remained largely separate to date (Kerr and Nanda, 2011). 
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many similarities between Spain and Italy), then the municipalities would serve as an exact 
approximation of the relevant geographical market.6  
 
Our main finding is that bank branch expansion significantly affected entrepreneurship. 
Using a panel data-set for almost all Spanish municipalities with more than 1,000 
inhabitants, we find that, between the years 1965-1987, branch expansion was responsible 
for a 0.24 percentage point increase in the number of commercial licenses per capita during 
the sample period. This is a particularly high value, representing 30% of the total increase 
in the municipalities’ average number of commercial licenses per capita during the years 
1965-1987. Moreover, we find that this effect is essentially driven by the savings banks, 
which had stronger regional development objectives and which expanded into 
municipalities with the greatest need for financial services. All our evidence points to the 
fact that bank expansion played a key role in the unprecedented process of economic 
development experienced by Spain during the second half of the 20th century. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of 
entrepreneurship and local financial development; Section 3 describes the Spanish Banking 
Expansion Plan and the data used in the regressions; Section 4 describes our research 
design; Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. A model of local financial development and entrepreneurship 
We use Evans and Jovanovic’s (1989) model of occupational choice to characterise an 
individual’s transition to entrepreneurship as a function of the financial development of the 
location to which they belong. We then derive an expression that relates the share of 
entrepreneurs in a particular location with its level of financial development. This 
expression is used to derive our main econometric specification and to discuss 
identification issues. 
 
Each individual   1,… ,  belonging to location  must decide whether to work for 
himself of for someone else. Wage work will yield him a wage of 	
 while a self-
employment opportunity will yield a payoff equal to 
  


 . As usual, 
  is 
                                                          
6
 While detailed municipality level information is not available, we know that the loans granted in a province 
by banks with no branches in that province are negligible (Jiménez et al., 2008). 
6
  
entrepreneurial ability, 
 is the amount of capital invested in the business, 
 is a lognormal 
disturbance and  ∈ 0,1 is common to all individuals. An entrepreneur net income is  
 
 
  
  
  
 (1)  
  is one plus the rate of interest (and is common to all individuals), 
 and 
 are liquid and 
illiquid assets respectively. Liquid assets can be directly invested in capital while illiquid 
wealth cannot. Both liquid and illiquid assets can be used as collateral for loans. Each 
person can borrow up to an amount that is proportional to his wealth. The factor of 
proportionality is denoted by   1 with   1.  is location-specific and can be 
considered an indicator of the financial development of location . The most that a person 
can invest in the business is his liquid assets plus the maximum borrowable quantity 
    1
  
  
    1
. If   1, financial development is at its 
minimum and the entrepreneur cannot borrow; hence, the most he can invest is his illiquid 
assets. As  increases an individual can borrow an increasing proportion of his total 
wealth. In bank-based financial systems where almost all loans are secured (the borrower 
pledging some wealth as collateral for the loan), it seems reasonable to assume that  will 
take values no larger than 2 (i.e., individuals can at most borrow an amount equal to their 
wealth). Indeed, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) estimate  at 1.4 using data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men in the US. The entrepreneur therefore faces 
the constraint 
 
 0  
  
    1
 (2) 
 
The entrepreneur does not know 
 , but does know 
 . Under risk neutrality the 
investment decision solves 
 
 max 				 	 #	

  
  
  
$
%∈#&,'()*+'(,-.*$																																											
 (3) 
 
which leads to the solution 
 
  /0*1 2- -,⁄  (4) 
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which is valid as long as the right-hand side is no greater than 
    1
 (the 
entrepreneur is unconstrained). For the entrepreneur  to be unconstrained, 
  must satisfy  
 
 
  
    1
-, /12 (5) 
 
The individual will choose to start a business if and only if his expected net income from 
doing so exceeds that from wage work:  
 
 456#	

  
  
  
$ 7 	
  
  
 (6) 
 
Since the left-hand side increases with 
  while the right-hand side does not, we can define 
selection into entrepreneurship in terms of the threshold 8
  9
 , 
 , 	
 ,  that makes 
an individual indifferent to either wage work or self-employment (i.e. that solves equation 
(6) as an exact inequality). More specifically, individual  will self-select into 
entrepreneurship if 
  8
 . Appendix A derives 8
 and shows that : 8
 :⁄  0. The 
share of entrepreneurs in location  is given by: 
 
 ;<5=	=>?=@=>=A;  B∑ 1D
  8
  0EF(
G- H I  (7) 
 
where 1J K is the indicator function. The degree to which financial development spurs 
entrepreneurship in a given location depends on the number of individuals in this location 
that find it profitable to switch from wage work to self-employment following a certain 
increase in financial development. An improvement in financial development causing a 
shift in  from - to L will only have a positive impact on entrepreneurship if there is a 
mass of individuals with 
  8
- M 0 and 
  8
L  0. This is likely to occur in 
localities with an initially low level of financial development and a large proportion of 
inhabitants with a low ratio of liquid assets to wages, high wages, a high amount of illiquid 
assets and high entrepreneurial capital. In this scenario, some individuals with high 
entrepreneurial capital will initially be prevented from becoming entrepreneurs because 
they are not able to start a business that is large enough to generate a total product which 
exceeds the non-entrepreneurial outside option. But as financial development improves 
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from - to L individuals become increasingly able to borrow a larger multiple of their 
wealth up to a point at which starting a business becomes more profitable than the outside 
option for some of them. 
 
Empirically, the effects of financial development on entrepreneurship can be estimated via 
two routes. Firstly, using individual-level data for a given location (with a fixed level of 
financial development) we can attempt to recover the structural parameters of the model, 
in line with Evans and Jovanovic (1989), so as to then calculate the share of entrepreneurs 
that can be attained for each level of financial development. Alternatively, in line with 
Guiso et al. (2004), the average effect of financial development on entrepreneurship can be 
obtained from the variation observed in financial development across locations (and ideally 
over time as well). Here, we adopt this second approach and study the relationship between 
financial development and entrepreneurship using municipality data from Spain for the 
period 1965-1987. The financial development of Spanish municipalities displayed a huge 
between and within variation during this period. Crucially, this variation was largely policy 
driven, which enables us to deal with the potential endogeneity of financial development.  
 
3. Data and program description 
3.1. Program description: the Banking Development Plan 
Spain’s modern banking system came into being around 1850, coinciding with the 
country’s industrial revolution, and by 1930 had achieved a notable size. However, its 
natural evolution was dramatically interrupted in 1936 with the outbreak of the Civil War. 
The division of the country into Nationalist and Republican factions brought Spain’s 
monetary and banking system to the point of collapse. In the immediate aftermath of the 
war, one of the first tasks addressed by the newborn Fascist regime was the reconstruction 
of the country’s financial system. This process was underpinned by a series of restrictive 
norms that ensured that the banking system was heavily regulated until virtually the end of 
the dictatorship. This regulatory wave ushered in a period of what was known as banking 
status quo from 1939 to 1964, decades characterised above all by the restrictions imposed by 
the Ministry of Finance limiting banking activity to those that had been registered as 
bankers prior to the Civil War. As such, new entrants could not overcome the barriers to 
the banking market, while incumbent banks were only permitted to open new branches 
under the strict supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The result was that the number of 
bank branches barely increased during the period of status quo.  
9
  
 
This stagnant financial system was aligned to Spain’s economic self-sufficiency of the 40s. 
However, as the economy progressively moved away from autarchy to a tentative opening 
up of its markets in the fifties, the economy began to demand greater financial resources. It 
was during these years that the inoperability of the banking system became more than 
apparent. In 1959 the government launched its National Plan of Economic Stabilization, 
which was to open up the country to trade and foreign direct investment, ushering in a 
decade of unprecedented economic growth. However, the banking system acted as a 
bottleneck, seriously limiting economic development. The response was the 1962 Banking 
Law which put an end to the status quo and established the foundations for an ambitious 
Banking Expansion Plan aimed at promoting the provision of banking services throughout 
Spain.7  
 
The proposals for expanding the system were unfolded in nine yearly plans (nine for 
commercial banks and a further nine for savings banks) introduced between 1964 and 1973 
(no plans were enforced in 1971).8 In each plan the Bank of Spain fixed the number of new 
branches to be created and the municipalities in which they were to be located. The banks 
were then required to select the branches they wished to open from the plan circulated by 
the Bank of Spain. The Bank of Spain’s decisions regarding branch locations were 
grounded on one of the following four criteria: a) the total absence of banking services; b) 
an insufficient banking service given the wealth, population and economic activity of the 
municipality and its surroundings; c) an insufficient banking service given the plans or 
economic development programs of the municipality and its surroundings; d) the 
convenience of more intense banking competition in the municipality. The preamble to the 
yearly expansion plans indicate that the Bank of Spain’s main concern was the absence of 
banking services afflicting many municipalities. This is reflected in its final branching 
decisions: 48% of the branch openings listed in the first seven plans responded to criterion 
“a” and 41% to criterion “b”. 9 The savings banks, more than their commercial 
counterparts, adhered most closely to this pattern, expanding their business most notably 
in municipalities with an absence or insufficiency of financial services (70% of their branch 
openings responded to criterion “a” and 99% to criteria “a” or “b”, while just 40% of the 
                                                          
7 For an excellent review of Spain’s banking history see Aceña (2005). 
8 A detailed description of the Banking Expansion Plans can be consulted in Cruz-Roche (1974). 
9 Access to the first seven yearly plans (seven expansion plans for banks and seven more for savings banks) 
was gained via the Bank of Spain’s library and the Ministry of Finance’s historical archives. 
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branch openings of the commercial banks responded to criterion “a” and 73% to criteria 
“a” or “b”). 
 
In the first seven Banking Expansion Plans (dating from 1964 to 1970), there was a clear 
tendency for branches to be opened in municipalities with initially low levels of financial 
development. This expansion process was interrupted in 1971 only to be resumed in 1972 
and 1973 with two additional plans that responded to a slightly different formula. This gave 
banks freedom of decision regarding the location of 80% of their new branches. Under this 
hybrid model, branches were presumably opened in relatively prosperous locations that 
presented initially higher levels of financial development and where profit opportunities 
were greater. In August 1974 this trend was further strengthened when the banking system 
was liberalized and the banks were allowed to determine their own branching activity (i.e. 
the number and location of their branches). Interestingly, the 1974 liberalization treated 
commercial and savings banks distinctly: while the commercial banks were given freedom 
to open branches nationwide, the savings banks were only allowed to open branches within 
specific provinces. As a result, following liberalization the commercial banks expanded 
their business within prosperous locations with high levels of financial development, 
whereas the savings banks were not able to follow suit until the eighties when branching 
restrictions were further relaxed. 
 
In short, the expansion of bank branching in Spain was largely policy driven. Restrictions 
on branching activity induced a time-varying relationship between a municipality’s initial 
financial development and branch expansion over time. While the Banking Expansion Plan 
was operational, (aggregate) branch expansion was more intense in municipalities with 
lower initial financial development. By contrast, after 1971, under the hybrid model, and 
particularly after 1975, following liberalization, branch expansion took place in 
municipalities with higher initial financial development. We exploit this policy driven time-
varying relationship between the initial financial development and branch expansion to 
provide a credible instrumentation of branch openings. In addition, we also exploit the 
difference in the way the expansion trajectories of the commercial and savings banks 
responded to the municipalities’ initial financial development after 1975 to identify not only 
the impact of aggregate branch expansion but also the effects accruing to each type of 
banking institution. 
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Figure 1 shows the evolution in the total number of bank branches over the period 1950-
1990 period. The number of bank branches remained steady during the status quo period, 
doubled during the Banking Expansion Plan and took off after the 1974 liberalization.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
3.2. Data 
We use a panel data-set for most Spanish municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants   
which spans the period 1965-1987 (see Appendix B for a detailed description of the 
dataset).10 This means that the dataset extends from the beginning of the Banking 
Expansion Plan until a period well after liberalization. The time variable of the panel is a 
year-pair indicator representing the years 1965-1966, 1967-1968 ..., 1987-1988.11 The data 
used in the paper are drawn primarily from the Banesto yearbooks (Anuario del Mercado 
Español del Banco Español de Crédito), which provide information on a series of variables that 
enable us to proxy quite closely the share of entrepreneurs (in the wholesale and retail 
industries) and the financial development of a municipality: 
 
Share of entrepreneurs – Although ideally we would wish to dispose of a measure of the 
total share of entrepreneurs working in all types of activity, only a yearly measure of the 
share of entrepreneurs in the wholesale and retail trade industries is available. This, 
however, is an especially interesting sector for our purposes here, because: (1) wholesale 
and retail trade industries are high-starting capital industries (see Table A1 in Hurst and 
Lusardi, 2004) that we would expect to benefit from improvements in financial 
development and (2) commercial establishments account for a relatively large share of the 
total number of establishments in Spanish municipalities.12 The share of entrepreneurs in 
the wholesale and retail trade industries is proxied by the number of commercial licenses 
per capita.13 Some establishments need more than one license to commercialise a 
sufficiently wide variety of products, but most establishments are relatively small and can 
                                                          
10 The panel spans the period 1965-1990 with some time invariant variables capturing initial conditions 
covering information for the period 1963-1964. 
11 Henceforth, for the sake of brevity, we mention only the first of the year-pairs when referring to each of 
the panel periods (e.g., we state 1965 whenever we refer to the year-pair 1965-1966, 1967 whenever we refer 
to the year-pair 1967-1988, and so on).  
12 On average commercial establishments accounted for 36% of the total number of establishments in 
Spanish municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants in 1970 (manufacturing and services related 
establishments accounted for 20 and 40% respectively). Source: 1970 Census of Establishments.  
13 Commercial licenses are municipality specific authorizations (later on replaced by the so called tax on 
economic activities) required to commercialise specific sets of products. 
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operate with just one license (the Banesto yearbooks estimate there to be in the order of 
1.2 commercial licenses per establishment). Thus, we can conclude that commercial 
licenses are a fairly good proxy for the number of establishments in the wholesale and retail 
industry.  
 
Financial development – We identify a municipality’s initial financial development as the 
number of bank branches per capita in the municipality in 1963-1964. Subsequent financial 
development is measured as the cumulative number of new bank branches per capita 
opened in each municipality since 1963-1964.14  
 
Controls – In the baseline regressions we will control for the number of telephones per 
capita and the number of inhabitants in the municipality in 1963-1964 (interacted with time 
dummies). 15 In the robustness checks we will also control for a series of province-level 
variables that capture time-varying policies with the potential to affect entrepreneurship. 
 
Table 1 provides summary definitions of the variables and their data sources. In the 
regressions we include all the municipalities observed over the whole period for which all 
the variables included in the regressions were available.16 Panels A and B in Table 2  
provide descriptive statistics for the main sample and for the subsample of municipalities 
included in any of the first seven Banking Expansion Plans respectively. Figure 2 compares 
the evolution in the total number of bank branches according to official data (solid line) 
and our main sample as used in the regressions (dashed line).17 The two lines evolve in 
parallel and virtually coincide, indicating that our municipality-level sample contains almost 
the whole population of branches opened during the period 1963-1987 countrywide. The 
average number of branches per capita increased from 0.2 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1963-
1964 to 1 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1987-1988 with a remarkable average increase of 0.8 
branch openings per 1000 inhabitants over the whole period. Similarly, the percentage of 
                                                          
14 We consider take into account branches from both commercial banks and savings banks, by far the two 
main banking institutions in Spain.  
15 The population variable available in the Banesto yearbooks comes from the last available census from the 
INE, which is updated every ten years. To construct the per capita variables (such as licenses per capita, 
branches per capita, telephones per capita, etc.) we constructed a yearly population variable by assuming a 
constant growth rate between any two censuses from the INE.  
16 The main reason for including municipalities observed for at least ten panel periods is that the instrument 
we use, based on the time-varying relationship between initial financial development and branch expansion, is 
inoperative for municipalities that are observed over a period of just a few years. However, we also 
experimented with alternative samples achieving similar results.  
17 The dashed line is an aggregation of the municipality level information on bank branches included in the 
Banesto yearbooks. 
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unbanked municipalities fell from 42 to 4% over the same period. Thus, it seems that 
financial development progressed from close to   1 to   1 for many municipalities. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 [INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
4. Research design 
We estimate the average effect of financial development on entrepreneurship from a 
regression of the form: 
 
 N+-  O ∗ QN  RS>?S;  T  UN  N (8) 
 
where N+- denotes the number of commercial licenses per capita and is our proxy for the 
share of entrepreneurs18, QN stands for the cumulative number of branch openings per 
capita and is our proxy for financial development N, T and UN are municipality and year 
(year-pair) fixed effects, and N is an idiosyncratic error term. O is our parameter of interest 
and measures the average increase in N attributable to a one-point increase in QN. Notice 
that the number of branches per capita in 1963-1964 was zero in many municipalities. So 
increases in QN are likely to capture increases in  from   1 (entrepreneurs cannot 
borrow) to   1 (entrepreneurs can borrow a fraction of their wealth) that should result 
in a positive and significant estimate of O. Causal interpretation of O, however, is 
problematic. Liberalized banking markets expand into relatively richer municipalities where 
inhabitants are per se more likely to start a business.19 This logic implies that O could 
provide an overestimate of the true effect of financial development on entrepreneurship. 
                                                          
18 We let commercial licenses per capita react with a lag to branch expansion for two main reasons. The first 
one is grounded purely on definition issues. Both commercial licenses and bank branches are measured at the 
last day of the year. Imagine that a branch is opened in the last month of year t. Then increases in the number 
of commercial licenses taking place over the whole year t will certainly not be due to this opening. The effects 
of this new branch opening will rather manifest at t+1. The second reason is more of a conceptual matter. It 
is well known that asymmetric information problems tend to be acute in small firms. Bank financing often 
involves a long-term relationship that may help attenuate these information problems. For instance, Berger 
and Udell (1992) find that borrowers with longer banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are less 
likely to pledge collateral. This suggests that a prudential time might be necessary for new branches to 
concede loans to new (and unknown) customers. 
19 Recall from Section 2 that municipalities with a high critical mass of potential switchers to entrepreneurship 
will have a large proportion of inhabitants with high wages, a high amount of illiquid assets and high 
entrepreneurial ability. These are precisely the most economically active municipalities into which banks are 
likely to naturally expand their activity. 
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On the other hand, the Banking Expansion Plan prioritized branch openings in relatively 
poorer municipalities where inhabitants are less likely to engage in self-employment. Thus, O could well underestimate the true impact of financial development on entrepreneurship.  
 
Hence, there is a need for credible instruments in order to be able to claim causality. Our 
instruments for branch expansion draw on the fact that the time-varying relationship 
between a municipality’s initial financial development and bank branch expansion was 
policy driven. This strategy should be sufficient for the identification of causal effects, if 
this time-varying relationship between a municipality’s initial financial development and 
bank branch expansion had no direct impact on entrepreneurial activity (i.e., no other 
municipality level entrepreneurship-related policies displayed a similar time-varying 
relationship with municipalities’ initial financial development).  
 
4.1. Initial financial development and bank branch expansion 
To study whether there really is a time-varying relationship in the way in which branch 
expansion related to initial financial development we start by estimating:  
  
										QN  V WXQ-YZ[ \ ]X-Y^_XG-YZ_  V `Xa-YZ[ \ ]X
-Y^_
XG-YZ_  T  UN  N															9 
 
where Q-YZ[ is our measure of the initial financial development indicating the number of 
branches per capita in 1963-1964. This variable enters the regression interacted with year-
pair dummies. ]X is a dummy which equals one when ?  ; (1965-1966 is the control year-
pair and the 1965-1966 dummy is omitted). WX denotes the year-specific coefficients. The 
difference between WX+- and WX tells us how a municipality’s initial financial development 
affected branch growth between years ?  ; and ?  ;  1. a-YZ[ denotes a vector of 
initial municipality conditions, which includes the number of inhabitants, the number of 
telephones per capita (all measured in 1963-1964) and a dummy variable with value one if 
the municipality is included in any of the first seven plans. These controls are also 
interacted with year-specific dummies. 
 
Table 3, provides the regression results of the interaction terms described in equation (9). 
Columns (1) and (2) report the results for all municipalities excluding and including the 
vector of initial municipality conditions. Columns (5) and (6) report the results obtained 
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with the sample of municipalities included in any of the first seven Banking Expansion 
Plans again excluding and including the vector of initial municipality conditions. The circles 
on the dotted line in Figure 3 plot the estimated WX coefficients reported in columns (2) and 
(6). Between the year pairs 1965-1966 and 1971-1972, while the Banking Expansion Plan 
was operational, the WX coefficients decrease with time. This means that financially less 
developed municipalities in 1963-1964 experienced a higher growth in the cumulative 
number of branch openings per capita during this period. This is consistent with our 
expectations as the Banking Expansion Plan sought to spread banking activity to 
municipalities where there was an absence of financial services. This trend weakens after 
1971-1972 when the hybrid model came into force and is definitely reverted after 1975-
1976 when the banking system was liberalized and the banks were able to open branches 
wherever they wished. The trend reversals in the way in which branch expansion relates to 
initial financial development is manifest more cleanly in the subsample of municipalities 
included in the Banking Expansion Plans. This is because some of the municipalities 
excluded from the plans remained unbanked as late as 1975. Some banks, essentially 
savings banks (see Figure 4), chose to expand into these municipalities partly because they 
could not do so in other marketplaces (expansion being limited to a given province) and 
partly because it was an easy way to saturate small municipalities (thereby escaping from 
competition). Hence, some openings took place in municipalities with lower levels of initial 
financial development. In what follows we run separate regressions for the different 
samples to show that the sluggish reaction to the 1974 branch liberalization observed in the 
main sample does not affect our results. 
 
It should be recalled that the 1974 liberalisation treated commercial and savings banks quite 
differently. While the former were able to open branches nationwide, the latter were only 
able to do so within given provinces. This triggered different time-varying patterns in the 
relationship between commercial and savings banks branch expansion and initial financial 
development. This is readily appreciated in Figure 4 where the square (triangle) markers 
plot the estimated coefficients on initial financial development from a regression of the 
form described in equation (9) with the dependent variable being the cumulative number of 
new commercial (savings) bank branches per capita opened in each municipality. 
Commercial banks quickly occupied prosperous locations with high initial financial 
development immediately following the liberalization. By the mid-eighties commercial 
banks had completed their expansion plans and so they began a process of consolidation 
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comprising five mergers that gave birth, among others, to the two present-day leaders in 
the Spanish banking sector (BBVA and SCH). Each of these mergers involved major 
restructuring and the closure of a number of branches (Fuenteslaz et al., 2004). The savings 
banks reacted to the 1974 liberalization quite differently. Since they already had branches in 
the main municipalities of their provinces, they could only expand their network by 
entering into unbanked municipalities. These were typically small, not very appealing 
municipalities that had been excluded from the Banking Plans. In 1979 branching 
restrictions were relaxed further and the savings banks were able to open branches in their 
traditional regions (or Autonomous Communities). In 1989 branching restrictions were 
lifted definitively enabling savings banks to branch nationwide. This move had been 
anticipated by the savings banks, which began expanding within their regions well before 
future competitors from other regions might do so (Fuenteslaz et al., 2004).20 The time-
varying relationship between aggregate branch expansion (dotted markers) and initial 
financial development is, therefore, the average of the actions taken by the commercial and 
savings banks. 
 
These 1971-1972 and 1975-1976 trend reversals in (aggregate) branch expansion coinciding 
with the implementation of the hybrid model and liberalization can be summarized by the 
following trend break model:21 
 															QN  W-Q-YZ[ \ c?  1965f  WLQ-YZ[ \ c?  1971f \ h_- W[Q-YZ[ \ c?  1975f \ h_i  WjQ-YZ[ \ h_- WiQ-YZ[ \ h_i  RS>?S;  T  UN  N																																					10 
 
where c?  1965f, c?  1971f and c?  1975f are linear time trends that enter the 
regression interacted with municipalities’ initial financial development, Q-YZ[. The c?  1971f and c?  1975f	linear trends are activated in 1971 and 1975 respectively and 
hence enter interacted with h_- and h_i, two dummy variables equal to one from 1971 and 
1975 respectively. The coefficients of interest W-, WL and W[ measure the average trend 
                                                          
20 Several articles published in “El País” (one of Spain’s leading newspapers) between 1982 and 1985 describe 
an environment in which the 1989 lifting of branching restrictions was perceived merely as a matter of time. 
Specifically, these articles document unsuccessful attempts to pass the 1989 law in 1982 and 1983 mainly as a 
result of the pressure brought to bear by small savings banks that sought to isolate their markets from 
increased competition. 
21 The liberalization dates from August 1974 so it was not until the year pair 1975-1976 that banks took 
control of their branching decisions. 
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relationship between a municipality’s initial financial development and branch expansion, 
and the subsequent change in this relationship after 1971 and 1975. The coefficients Wj and Wi measure intercept changes in the relationship between initial financial development and 
branch expansion in 1971 and 1975.  The set of controls a-YZ[ enters the regression in the 
same way as Q-YZ[. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 [INSERT FIGURE 3] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4] 
 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 report the results of the trend break model described in 
equation (10) using the main sample and excluding and including the controls respectively. 
The two sets of results are extremely similar. Focusing on the results reported in column 
(4) we find that, between 1965 and 1971, one additional point of initial financial 
development reduced branch openings by 0.06 points annually. Between 1971 and 1975 
branch expansion was unrelated to initial financial development.22 After 1975 one 
additional point of initial financial development reduced branch openings by 0.036 points 
annually.23 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use just the sample of 
municipalities included in any of the first seven Banking Expansion Plans (columns 7 and 
8). Focusing on column (8) we find that, between 1965 and 1971, one additional point of 
initial financial development reduced branch openings by 0.08 points annually. Between 
1971 and 1975 branch expansion was unrelated to initial financial development.24 After 
1975 one additional point of initial financial development reduced branch openings by 0.07 
points annually.25 
 
The diamonds on the dotted line in Figure 3 show the WX coefficients implied by the trend 
break estimates (calculated as WX  W- \ c?  1965f  WL \ c?  1971f \ h_-  W[ \c?  1975f \ h_i). The pattern of the coefficients obtained in the trend break model is 
very similar to that of the coefficients obtained in equation (9). This suggests that the trend 
break model is an accurate approximation of the interaction-term model in equation (9). 
                                                          
22
 The linear combination W-  WL  0.013 is not significantly different from zero. 
23 The linear combination W-  WL  W[  0.036 is significant at 1%. 
24
 The linear combination W-  WL  0.02 is not significantly different from zero. 
25 The linear combination W-  WL  W[  0.07 is significant at 1%. 
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This is particularly true for the subsample of municipalities included in the Banking 
Expansion Plan. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Initial financial development and entrepreneurship 
Before moving to the evidence provided by the instrumental variables we first examine the 
more intermediate results. So far we have shown that branching policies induced a very 
particular time-varying pattern in the relationship between municipalities’ initial financial 
development and branch expansion over the period 1965-1987. If branch expansion did 
have an impact on the number of licenses per capita, we would expect to observe the same 
time-varying pattern in the relationship between commercial licenses per capita and initial 
financial development. To check if this is the case we fit a regression of the form: 
 
										N+-  V XQ-YZ[ \ ]X-Y^_XG-YZ_  V `Xa-YZ[ \ ]X
-Y^_
XG-YZ_  T  UN  N								11 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report the results for the main sample excluding and 
including the controls respectively. Columns (5) and (6) report the results obtained with the 
sample of municipalities included in any of the first seven Banking Expansion Plans, again 
excluding and including the vector of initial municipality conditions. The X coefficients 
reported in columns (2) and (6) of Table 4 are plotted in Figure 5 together with the WX 
coefficients reported in columns (2) and (6) of Table 3. The response of commercial 
licenses per capita to initial financial development almost perfectly tracks the branch 
expansion response to initial financial development.26 Indeed, when we plot the X 
coefficients against the WX coefficients we observe a strong positive relationship between 
the two (see Figure 6). This implies that in periods when branch expansion takes place in 
relatively more (less) initially financially developed municipalities the number of 
commercial licenses per capita also increases more sharply in more (less) initially financially 
developed municipalities. Under the identifying assumption that initial financial 
development only affected the number of commercial licenses per capita through branch 
                                                          
26 This common pattern is not driven by the fact that both commercial licenses and branch expansion are 
defined in per capita terms. We also estimated equation (11) with the dependent variable in levels including 
and excluding the number of inhabitants in the right-hand side and the same pattern still emerged. Defining 
the dependent variable in per capita terms is useful however because municipalities differ widely in size so 
that that there is a great deal of dispersion in the number of commercial licenses, with some extremely large 
values acting as outliers. 
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expansion this can be taken as compelling evidence that branch expansion had a causal 
impact on entrepreneurship. A tentative measure of this causal effect can be gauged from a 
regression of the form  
 																											X  5  nWX  R-h-Y_-RLh-Y_i  X																																																							12 
 
where we allow for intercept changes in the relationship between X and WX in 1971 and 
1975. The estimated n coefficient is 3.5 for the main sample and 8.3 for the sample of 
municipalities included in the plans. This result implies that a one-point increase in the 
response of branch expansion to initial financial development is associated with an increase 
of between 3.5 and 8.3 per cent in the response of commercial licenses per capita to initial 
financial development.  
  
Table 4 also shows results from the linear trend break model described in equation (10) 
where the dependent variable is the number of commercial licenses per capita. The results 
are in line with those of the interaction-term model and suggest that commercial licenses 
underwent the expected trend reversals in their relationship with initial financial 
development. Columns (3) and (4) report the results based on the main sample. Let us 
focus on the results in column (4) corresponding to the specification with controls. The 
number of commercial licenses per capita decreased more sharply in more financially 
developed municipalities between 1965 and 1971 when one additional point in the 1963-
1964 number of branches per capita reduced the number of licenses per capita by 0.55 
points annually. Between 1971 and 1975 commercial licenses were unrelated to initial 
financial development.27 After 1975 one additional point in initial financial development 
increased the number of commercial licenses per capita by 0.1 points annually.28 If we 
focus on the subsample of municipalities included in the plans (Table 4, column 8) we find 
that the number of commercial licenses per capita is unrelated to initial financial 
development until 1975. After 1975 one additional point in initial financial development 
increased the number of commercial licenses per capita by 0.62 points annually.29 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 [INSERT FIGURE 5] 
                                                          
27
 The linear combination W-  WL  0.077 is not significantly different from zero. 
28 The linear combination W-  WL  W[  0.102 is significant at 10%. 
29 The linear combination W-  WL  W[  0.62 is significant at 1%. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 6] 
 
5.2. Instrumental variables evidence 
We now turn to the evidence provided by the instrumental variables of the way in which 
the number of branches per capita affected entrepreneurship. We run two types of IV 
regressions. The first is based on the interaction terms specification with the first stage 
regression of the IV estimates being as in equation (9) (shown in Table 3, columns 2 and 6) 
and the second stage regression being of the form:  
 
													N+-  O ∗ QN  V `Xa-YZ[ \ ]X-Y^_XG-YZ_  T  UN  N																																		13 
 
where the instruments for QN are the full set of interaction terms ∑ WXQ-YZ[ \ ]X-Y^_XG-YZ_ . 
The identifying assumption underlying this IV regression is that the time-varying 
relationship between a municipality’s initial financial development and bank branch 
expansion had no direct impact on entrepreneurial activity and, hence, the set of interaction 
terms ∑ WXQ-YZ[ \ ]X-Y^_XG-YZ_  can be safely excluded from equation (13). This identifying 
assumption seems fairly plausible because the time-varying relationship between 
commercial licenses per capita and initial financial development mimics very closely that of 
(aggregate) branch expansion (see Figure 5). In turn, the latter is the average of the actions 
taken by the commercial and savings banks, each following opposite trends after 1975 (see 
Figure 4). This can be taken as strong evidence that commercial licenses reacted to branch 
expansion and not to arbitrary omitted factors. Moreover, this specification is quite 
demanding in that it requires commercial licenses per capita to exhibit, year by year, the 
same relationship with initial financial development as branch expansion (this requirement 
is largely satisfied as demonstrated by Figures 5 and 6). This requirement has an important 
payoff: it is difficult to identify an omitted factor with exactly the same time-varying 
response to initial financial development as branch expansion. Confounding factors might 
display the same relationship with initial financial development over one, two or perhaps 
three panel periods, but it is highly unlikely over the whole panel span.  
 
The second type of IV regressions we run is based on the trend break specification with 
the first stage regression of the IV estimates as in equation (10) (shown in Table 3, columns 
4 and 8) and the second stage regression being of the form: 
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N+-  O ∗ QN  `-Q-YZ[ \ c?  1965f  `LQ-YZ[ \ h_- `[Q-YZ[ \ h_i  RS>?S;  T  UN  N																																					14 
 
where Q-YZ[ \ c?  1965f is a municipality-specific trend that captures the way in which 
entrepreneurship related to initial financial development. Deviations from this trend, Q-YZ[ \ c?  1971f \ h_- and Q-YZ[ \ c?  1975f \ h_i, are used as our instruments 
for QN. Notice that the identifying assumption differs slightly from that in equation (13) 
where we needed the full time-varying pattern in the relationship between initial financial 
development and bank branch expansion to be exclusive of branch expansion. Here we 
acknowledge that branch expansion and commercial licenses might share a common trend 
and simply require the 1971 and 1975 trend reversals to be exclusive of branch expansion. 
This specification has one advantage and one disadvantage over the previous one. The 
advantage is that we now allow licenses per capita and branch expansion to share a 
common trend. The disadvantage is that we now simply exploit coincidences in the trend 
reversals displayed by both branch expansion and commercial licenses. These trend 
reversals are relatively infrequent (there being just two) and concentrate around 1975, so 
they may be more easily shared by unobserved factors. Instead, the previous specification 
exploited coincidences in all the interactions describing the time-varying relationship of 
commercial licenses and branch expansion with initial financial development. There are 
many such interactions (as many as 12) and they are unlikely to be fully shared by 
unobserved factors.    
 
Table 5 provides the IV evidence. The IV estimates all take very similar values and, 
consistent with a program-based explanation, are substantially larger than the FE estimates 
regardless of the specification (interaction terms vs. trend break) or the sample (entire 
sample vs. municipalities included in the plans) used. This result is unsurprising given that 
the bulk of branch expansion took place in municipalities with lower levels of initial 
financial development and presumably poorer economic prospects (see Figure 3). This 
causes a downward bias in O that is eliminated when we instrument branch expansion. 
Notice that this bias seems to be larger for the main sample as the fixed effects estimates in 
columns (1) and (3) are smaller than the fixed effects estimates of columns (5) and (7). This 
makes perfect sense precisely because the bulk of branch expansion takes place in 
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municipalities with lower levels of initial financial development in the main sample.30 Let us 
now focus on the IV results. Starting with the main sample, the point estimate obtained 
with the interaction terms specification (column 2) implies that one additional percentage 
point in the cumulative number of new bank branches per capita increases the number of 
licenses per capita by 5.32 percentage points. As expected, the trend break specification 
(column 4) delivers very similar results with a point estimate of 6.75. This suggests that 
allowing for a common trend between branch expansion and commercial licenses per 
capita and simply exploiting the 1971 and 1975 trend breaks does not substantially differ 
from exploiting the full time-varying pattern in the relationship between initial financial 
development and bank branch expansion. As for the subsample of municipalities included 
in the plans, the interaction terms and the trend break specifications (columns 6 and 8) 
deliver similar point estimates of 5 and 6.12 respectively. We now move on to the 
interpretation of our estimates. Evaluated at the sample average, the point estimate of 
column (2) implies that branch expansion was responsible for a 0.24 (5.32*0.045) 
percentage point increase in the number of commercial licenses per capita during the 
sample period. This is a very large value as it represents 30% of the total increase in the 
municipalities’ average number of commercial licenses per capita during the years 1965-
1987.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
5.3. Who is driving the effects: commercial banks or savings banks? 
The different responses in the branch expansion of commercial and savings banks to initial 
financial development enable us to identify their separate effects on the number of 
commercial licenses per capita. From a conceptual viewpoint, we have already argued that 
savings banks are more concerned with local development than are the commercial banks. 
Partly because of this concern for regional development and partly because of branching 
restrictions, savings banks expanded more intensely into the smaller municipalities that 
presented the severest credit constraints. Thus, we would expect savings banks to have a 
greater impact on entrepreneurship. Indeed, it seems that the response of commercial 
licenses to initial financial development (shown in Figure 5) mimics more closely that of 
                                                          
30 Figure 3 shows that while the 1975 trend reversal in branch expansion is very clear for the subsample of 
municipalities included in the plans, it is much fuzzier for the main sample in which branch expansion does 
not show a clear reversal until 1983. Between 1975 and 1983, branch expansion remained rather flat with 
respect to the municipalities’ initial financial development meaning that many new branch openings were still 
taking place in municipalities with low levels of initial financial development.  
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the savings banks than that of the commercial banks (shown in Figure 4). In Table 6 we 
replicate the regressions from Table 5 but use separate measures of the branch expansion 
of commercial banks and savings banks as opposed to aggregate bank expansion. The 
branch expansion of the savings banks is always positive and significant while that of the 
commercial banks is never significant and, on occasions, is even negative. This confirms 
that the previous results are essentially driven by the savings banks.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
5.4. Discussion of the validity of the identifying assumption 
The key identifying assumption underlying our IV regressions is that the time-varying 
relationship between initial financial development and branch expansion had no direct 
impact on entrepreneurial activity. In other words, no other municipality level 
entrepreneurship-related policies displayed a similar time-varying relationship with the 
municipalities’ initial financial development. If this requirement did not hold we would 
then have an omitted variable bias and our instruments could be picking up not only the 
policy driven component of branch expansion but other effects stemming from policies or 
environmental changes undergoing similar trend reversals.  
 
In this respect, it must be admitted that the reversals in the relationship between initial 
financial development and branch expansion coincided with the 1975 political transition 
from dictatorship to democracy. The 1975 political transition represented a turning point 
that involved major changes at many levels. This finding raises legitimate doubts as to 
whether branch expansion and commercial licenses reacted to shifts in branching policies 
or rather they commoved in response to institutional changes. A particularly worrying 
scenario would be one in which there was a policy shift from having unanimously favoured 
municipalities with lower levels of initial financial development during the dictatorship to 
unanimously favouring municipalities with higher levels of initial financial development 
under democracy.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, entrepreneurship-promotion policies did not undergo such 
trend reversals with respect to the municipalities’ initial financial development. If anything, 
it would seem that they were exposed to trend reversals in quite the opposite direction. 
Regional and welfare policies benefited less economically developed areas before 1975 and 
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continued to benefit them (even more so) after 1975. Transport policies favoured more 
economically developed areas until 1985 and began benefiting less economically developed 
areas thereafter. In Table 7 we check that our IV results are robust to a series of (province-
level) controls that capture each of these time-varying policies. For the sake of space, we 
only report the results obtained after adding these controls to the interaction terms 
specification (for the main sample) reported in Table 5, column 2 (similar results were 
obtained with the trend break specification and with the sample of municipalities included 
in the plans). 
 
Regional policies – Admittedly the Banking Expansion Plan was not an isolated action. It 
was indeed conceived as a complement to the 1964-1974 Development Plans that sought 
to rectify the marked economic and social disparities between Spanish regions by 
promoting growth in less developed areas.31 Thus, banking and regional policies followed 
similar trends during the period 1964-1974, both seeking to promote entrepreneurship in 
less financially (i.e., economically) developed areas. However, the regional development 
policy did not exhibit a trend reversal after the political transition to democracy in 1975. 
Rather it underwent a period of “inertia and accumulation” whereby many of the 
instruments that were introduced during the 1964-1974 remained operative.32 In Table 7, 
column (1), we control for an indicator of the number of regional programs active in the 
province to which the municipality belongs. This variable enters the equation significantly 
but barely changes our IV point estimate.   
 
Welfare policies – After the 1975 shift to democracy the tax system was reformed with the 
introduction of personal income tax, corporation tax and VAT (among others), which 
resulted in a huge increase in tax revenues. These revenues served to finance the welfare 
state (public education and health) and led to very generous transfers from richer to poorer 
regions in order to guarantee the equalization of the quality of services throughout   
                                                          
31 See Pujadas and Font (1998) for a detailed explanation of Spanish regional policy during this period. The 
First Development Plan (1964-1967) essentially channelled public aid to a small list of cities in the hope they 
might become “Industrial Development Poles”. The Second Development Plan (1969-1972) simply extended 
the list of cities that would benefit from public aid. The Third Development Plan (1972-1975) modified the 
strategy and worked with the notion of “Great Areas of Industrial Expansion” that extended over larger 
regions rather than just cities. 
32 Indeed, many “Great Areas of Industrial Expansion” in the Third Development Plan were defined after 
1975 (Andalusia in 1975, Extremadura in 1978 and Castilla León in 1979). 
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Spanish territory.33 Thus, democracy brought about redistributive efforts (absent during the 
dictatorship) towards less developed areas, while banking liberalization triggered branch 
openings in the most developed areas. In Table 7, columns (2) and (3), we include 
province-level measures of capital stocks in education and health. Again, the point estimate 
remains unchanged.    
 
Transport infrastructure policies – Highway infrastructures, inexistent in Spain at the 
beginning of our sample period in 1965, were included on the political agenda in 1967 with 
the drafting of the Spanish National Highways Program (SNHP). The SNHP planned the 
construction of up to 6,430 kilometres of toll highways. However, only 1,807 kilometres of 
these were built between 1967 and 1985, concentrated primarily in the prosperous north-
east and Mediterranean coast corridors. The remaining stretches, linking corridors of lesser 
economic activity (primarily the radial routes converging on Madrid), turned out to be 
unprofitable under a toll regime and were aborted. They were subsequently constructed in 
a toll-free regime as part of the 1984-1991 General Road Plan (even though many of these 
itineraries did not become operational until 1990). In short, highways were constructed in 
municipalities with higher economic (i.e. financial) development during the period 1967-
1985 and in municipalities with lower economic (i.e. financial) development thereafter (Bel, 
2010). Again, it would seem that if there was a trend reversal in highway construction it 
went in the opposite direction to that observed in branch expansion. In Table 7, columns 
(4) and (5), we include the province-level capital stock in toll highways and other road 
infrastructure. The point estimates on branch expansion are slightly larger in all cases. 
Finally, in column (6), which includes all the controls, the point estimate on branch 
expansion remains largely unchanged. 
 
To sum up, regional and welfare policies continued or even intensified their support to the 
less developed areas of Spain after 1975. When we include province-level measures of 
regional, welfare and transport policies in our IV regressions the point estimates remain 
largely unchanged. Hence, it would seem that the trend reversals in entrepreneurship-
related policies triggered by the 1975 political transition do not affect our results.  
 
                                                          
33 Some studies have estimated that as much as 8 to 10 per cent of the GDP of the richest regions is being 
transferred to the poorest. This has been the subject of much debate in Spain over recent decades with the 
wealthier Autonomous Communities claiming that this fiscal deficit is undermining their growth potential.  
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[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the extent to which the expansion of Spain’s banking system 
during the second half of the twentieth century contributed to the country’s process of 
rapid economic growth. Between 1965 and 1987 Spain’s banking system evolved from a 
level of financial development and inclusion that was typical of developing countries to one 
more in keeping with a developed country. This episode of expansion in the country’s 
banking system (one, moreover, that was heavily concentrated in time) offers a unique 
opportunity to assess the overall gains of comprehensive banking development. Here, we 
have documented the marked impact that bank branch expansion had on the country’s 
entrepreneurial activity.  
 
Causal identification of the effect of branch expansion on the number of commercial 
licenses per capita has been feasible as the expansion was largely policy driven. An 
ambitious Banking Expansion Plan, together with a subsequent relaxation of branch 
regulations, crucially tied branch expansion to the initial financial development of the 
municipalities. Between 1965 and 1973, while the Banking Expansion Plan was operative, 
branches were opened in the country’s backward municipalities that suffered from a 
shortage of banking services. The reverse was true after 1974 when branching restrictions 
were lifted (fully in the case of commercial banks and only partially in that of savings 
banks) enabling banks (initially the commercial entities but later on also the savings banks) 
to expand, understandably, into prosperous locations with high levels of initial financial 
development. We have exploited the policy driven (and plausibly exogenous) time-varying 
relationship between the municipalities’ initial financial development and branch expansion 
to identify the effects of this expansion.  
 
We expected that the substantial wave of branch expansions that we have analyzed would 
have had a considerable impact on the municipalities’ provision of financial services. In 
1965 bank branches were absent from many Spanish municipalities due to strict regulations 
that had left the bank branch network firmly anchored at pre-1939 (Civil War) levels. This 
meant that many municipalities were financially unattended and some firms and 
households had no option but to resort to informal credit markets (particularly in rural 
areas). However, the subsequent expansion in the branch network ensured the presence of 
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a branch in virtually all of Spain’s municipalities (with more than 1,000 inhabitants) and the 
gradual incorporation of an increasing number of inhabitants to the formal banking system. 
Evaluated at the sample mean, we find that branch expansion accounts for a third of the 
overall increase in the number of commercial licenses per capita over the period. This 
effect was essentially driven by the savings banks, which have stronger regional 
development objectives than commercial banks and which expanded more intensely into 
unbanked municipalities with a shortage of financial services. 
 
Finally, we should highlight that an interesting prediction of occupational choice models, 
such as the one described in Section 2, is that financial development does not necessarily   
spur entrepreneurship under all conditions, but it does so essentially in environments with: 
(a) large returns to capital where incentives to invest are high; (b) low levels of initial 
financial development where individuals are likely to suffer financial constraints; (c) wealthy 
inhabitants who can capitalize on the value of their wealth (such as housing that serves as 
collateral for loans). Spain met all these requirements and hence was ready to take 
advantage of branch expansion; however, similar waves of branch expansion might fail to 
achieve the same effects in contexts where these conditions do not apply. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Evolution of the total number of bank branches under changing scenarios 
 
 
 
Sources: Anuario Estadístico de la Banca Privada (AEBanca) and Anuario Estadístico de las Cajas 
de Ahorros Confederadas (CECA).  
 
Figure 2. Total number of bank branches in official data vs. those in the main sample  
 
 
 
Sources: Anuario Estadístico de la Banca Privada (AEBanca), Anuario Estadístico de las Cajas de 
Ahorros Confederadas (CECA) and Anuario del Mercado Español del Banco Español de Crédito 
(Banesto) 
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Figure 3. Initial financial development and branch expansion 
 
Notes: the solid line with round markers plots the yearly coefficients WX on initial financial 
development (as measured by the number of bank branches per capita in 1963-1964) from a 
regression of the form described in equation (9) whose results are reported in Table 3, columns (2) 
and (6). Circles around the markers denote significance at a 5% level. The dashed line with diamond 
markers plots the yearly coefficients implied by the trend break model described in equation (10) 
whose results are reported in Table 3, columns (4) and (8). In all cases the dependent variable is the 
cumulative number of new bank branches per capita opened in each municipality. All regressions 
include as controls the number of inhabitants and the number of telephones per capita (both 
variables enter the corresponding regressions in the same way as Q-YZ[).  
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Figure 4. Initial financial development and branch expansion by banking institution 
 
Notes: the solid line with round markers plots the yearly coefficients on initial financial 
development from a regression of the form described in equation (9) where the dependent variable 
is the cumulative number of new bank branches per capita opened in each municipality (just as in 
Figure 3). The dash-dot line with square markers plots the yearly coefficients on initial financial 
development from a regression of the form described in equation (9) where the dependent variable 
is the cumulative number of new commercial bank branches per capita opened in each 
municipality. The dashed line with triangle markers plots the yearly coefficients on initial financial 
development from a regression of the form described in equation (9) where the dependent variable 
is the cumulative number of new savings bank branches per capita opened in each municipality. All 
regressions include as controls the number of inhabitants and the number of telephones per capita 
(both variables enter the corresponding regressions in the same way as Q-YZ[). Circles, squares and 
triangles around the markers denote significance at a 5% level. 
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Figure 5. Initial financial development, branch expansion and entrepreneurship 
 
Notes: the solid line with round markers plots the yearly coefficients WX on initial financial 
development from a regression of the form described in equation (9) whose results are reported in 
Table 3, columns (2) and (6) (just as in Figure 3). The dashed line with triangle markers plots the 
yearly coefficients X (divided by 10) on initial financial development from a regression of the form 
described in equation (11), whose results are reported in Table 4, columns (2) and (6). All 
regressions include as controls the number of inhabitants and the number of telephones per capita 
(both variables enter the corresponding regressions in the same way as Q-YZ[). Circles and triangles 
around the markers denote significance at a 5% level. 
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Figure 6. Correlation between commercial licenses and branch expansion response to initial 
financial development 
 
Notes: this figure plots the X coefficients obtained from a regression of the form described in 
equation (11) against the WX coefficients obtained from a regression of the form described in (9). 
The X used in the graphs is purged of h-Y_- and h-Y_i effects.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Variables definition 
     
Variable  Definition  Source 
     
Municipality-level variables 
     
Commercial licenses per 
capita 
 number of commercial licenses of the municipality 
over total population of the municipality 
 Banesto yearbooks 
  
     
Cumulative number of 
new branches per capita 
 cumulative number of commercial and savings 
bank branches opened in the municipality since 
1963-1964 over total population of the 
municipality 
 Banesto yearbooks 
  
     
Cumulative number of 
new commercial bank 
branches per capita 
 cumulative number of bank branches and savings 
bank branches opened in the municipality since 
1963-1964 over total population of the 
municipality 
 Banesto yearbooks 
     
Cumulative number of 
new savings bank 
branches per capita 
 cumulative number of bank branches and savings 
bank branches opened in the municipality since 
1963-1964 over total population of the 
municipality 
 Banesto yearbooks 
     
Number of bank branches 
per capita in 1963-1964 
(initial financial 
development) 
 number of bank branches and savings bank 
branches of the municipality in 1963-1964 over 
total population of the municipality in 1963-1964 
 Banesto yearbooks 
  
     
Number of inhabitants in 
1963-1964 
 population of the municipality in the year 1963-
1964 
 Banesto yearbooks 
     
Telephones per capita in 
1963-1964 
 number of telephones per capita of the 
municipality in 1963-1964 over total population of 
the municipality in the year 1963-1964 
 Banesto yearbooks 
  
     
Province-level variables 
     
Number of regional 
programs 
 number of regional programs active in the 
province where the municipality is located 
 Based on information in 
Pujadas and Font (1998) 
     
Capital stock in education 
(per capita) 
 capital stock in education (1986 thousands of 
Euros) over province total population 
 IVIE-BBVA Foundation 
     
Capital stock in health (per 
capita) 
 capital stock in health (1986 thousands of Euros) 
over province total population 
 IVIE-BBVA Foundation 
     
Capital stock in toll-
highways (per capita) 
 capital stock in toll highways (1986 thousands of 
Euros) over province total population 
 IVIE-BBVA Foundation 
     
Capital stock in other road 
infrastructure (per capita) 
 capital stock in other road infrastructure (1986 
thousands of Euros) over province total 
population  
 IVIE-BBVA Foundation 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Panel A: All municipalities 
(N=2,343, N*T=28,116)  
Panel B: Municipalities in the Banking Expansion Plan 
(N=1,375, N*T=16,500) 
  Mean Standard deviation Min Max  Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
   overall within     overall within   
Municipality-level variables            
 Commercial Licenses per capita 0.0199 0.0088 0.0043 0.0006 0.1028  0.0208 0.0093 0.0046 0.0017 0.1028 
 Cumulative number of new bank branches per capita 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0051  0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0051 
 Cumulative number of new commercial bank branches per capita 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0036  0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0036 
 Cumulative number of new savings bank branches per capita 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0029  0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0029 
 Number of bank branches per capita in 1963-1964 0.0002 0.0003 0 0 0.0021  0.0002 0.0002 0 0 0.0016 
 Number of inhabitants in 1963-1964 10,778 67,724 0 1,008 2,580,078  15,782 88,017 0 1,008 2,580,078 
 Telephones per capita in 1963-1964 0.04 0.05 0 0 0.94  0.04 0.06 0 0 0.94 
         
Province-level variables            
 Intensity of regional policies 0.44 0.58 0.42 0 2.00  0.45 0.59 0.41 0 2.00 
 Capital stock in education 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.52  0.14 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.52 
 Capital stock in health 0.07 0.04 0.03 0 0.37  0.06 0.04 0.03 0 0.37 
 Capital stock in toll highways 0.11 0.27 0.18 0 2.18  0.11 0.25 0.17 0 2.18 
 Capital stock in other road infrastructure 0.35 0.18 0.10 0.10 1.66  0.33 0.18 0.09 0.10 1.66 
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Table 3. Bank branch expansion as a function of initial financial development 
 All municipalities  Municipalities included in the plans 
 Interaction terms 
specification 
 Trend break 
specification 
 Interaction terms 
specification 
 Trend break 
specification 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) Q-YZ[ \ ]-YZ_ -0.05* -0.06*     -0.10** -0.10**    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-YZY -0.11*** -0.12***     -0.14*** -0.15***    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y_- -0.15*** -0.16***     -0.18*** -0.19***    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y_[ -0.13*** -0.15***     -0.16*** -0.17***    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y_i -0.10*** -0.15***     -0.15*** -0.20***    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y__ -0.11*** -0.17***     -0.04 -0.11**    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y_Y -0.07** -0.12***     0.01 -0.05    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y^- -0.07** -0.12***     0.05 -0.01    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y^[ -0.03 -0.09***     0.12** 0.05    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y^i 0.10*** 0.04     0.26*** 0.19***    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y^_ 0.11*** 0.04     0.29*** 0.22***    
 (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05)    Q-YZ[ \ c?  1965f    -0.05*** -0.06***     -0.07*** -0.08*** 
    (0.02) (0.02)     (0.02) (0.03) Q-YZ[ \ c?  1971f \ h_-    0.07** 0.07**     0.09* 0.09 
    (0.03) (0.04)     (0.06) (0.06) Q-YZ[ \ c?  1975f \ h_i    0.02 0.02     0.05 0.05 
    (0.03) (0.03)     (0.05) (0.05) Q-YZ[ \ h_-    0.02 0.02     0.04 0.04 
    (0.04) (0.04)     (0.06) (0.07) Q-YZ[ \ h_i    -0.03 -0.06     -0.00 -0.04 
    (0.05) (0.05)     (0.08) (0.08) 
            
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Other controls NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES 
            
Within R-squared 0.48 0.49  0.48 0.49  0.54 0.55  0.54 0.55 
Number of municipalities 2,343 2,343  2,343 2,343  1,375 1,375  1,375 1,375 
Observations 28,116 28,116  28,116 28,116  16,500 16,500  16,500 16,500 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The dependent variable is the number of 
new bank branches per capita accumulated in each municipality since 1963. Explanatory variables reported are the number 
of bank branches per capita in the year 1963 interacted with year-pair dummies for the interaction terms specification and 
the number of bank branches per capita in the year 1963 interacted with (a) a time trend, (b) a post 1971 time trend, (c) a 
post 1975 time trend, (d) a post-1971 dummy and (e) a post-1975 dummy for the trend break specification. Other controls 
include population, telephones per capita (all measured in 1963) and enter the regression in the same way as branches per 
capita in 1963. The trend break specification always includes a 1965-1987 time trend, a post-1971 dummy interacted with a 
1971-1987 time trend and a post-1975 dummy interacted with a 1975-1987 time trend. 
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Table 4. Initial financial development and entrepreneurship 
 All municipalities  Municipalities included in the plans 
 Interaction terms 
specification 
 Trend break 
specification 
 Interaction terms 
specification 
 Trend break 
specification 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) Q-YZ[ \ ]-YZ_ -0.25 -0.22     0.06 0.11    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-YZY -1.08** -1.09**     -0.54 -0.54    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y_- -2.36*** -2.24***     -3.71*** -3.56***    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y_[ -2.43*** -2.25***     -3.35*** -3.20***    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y_i -2.31*** -2.23***     -3.80*** -3.71***    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y__ -2.59*** -2.71***     -3.97*** -4.19***    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y_Y -2.64*** -2.59***     -3.70*** -3.61***    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y^- -2.45*** -2.18***     -4.10*** -3.69***    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y^[ -2.26*** -2.27***     -2.73*** -2.70***    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y^i -2.29*** -2.25***     -2.37*** -2.20***    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ ]-Y^_ -1.42*** -1.69***     0.55 0.40    
 (0.44) (0.44)     (0.81) (0.82)    Q-YZ[ \ c?  1965f    -0.54** -0.55**     -0.27 -0.27 
    (0.22) (0.22)     (0.40) (0.41) Q-YZ[ \ c?  1971f \ h_-    0.48 0.54     0.63 0.63 
    (0.49) (0.50)     (0.90) (0.92) Q-YZ[ \ c?  1975f \ h_i    0.19 0.11     0.26 0.26 
    (0.44) (0.45)     (0.82) (0.83) Q-YZ[ \ h_-    -0.84 -0.72     -3.01*** -2.87*** 
    (0.56) (0.57)     (1.04) (1.06) Q-YZ[ \ h_i    -0.18 -0.32     -1.73 -1.82 
    (0.72) (0.73)     (1.34) (1.36) 
            
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Other controls NO YES  NO YES  NO YES  NO YES 
            
Within R-squared 0.25 0.26  0.25 0.25  0.33 0.33  0.33 0.33 
Number of municipalities 2,343 2,343  2,343 2,343  1,375 1,375  1,375 1,375 
Observations 28,116 28,116  28,116 28,116  16,500 16,500  16,500 16,500 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The dependent variable is the number of 
commercial licenses per capita in the year t+1. Explanatory variables reported are the number of bank branches per capita 
in the year 1963 interacted with year-pair dummies for the interaction terms specification and the number of bank 
branches per capita in the year 1963 interacted with (a) a time trend, (b) a post 1971 time trend, (c) a post 1975 time trend, 
(d) a post-1971 dummy and (e) a post-1975 dummy for the trend break specification. Other controls include population, 
telephones per capita (all measured in 1963) and enter the regression in the same way as branches per capita in 1963. The 
trend break specification always includes a 1965-1987 time trend, a post-1971 dummy interacted with a 1971-1987 time 
trend and a post-1975 dummy interacted with a 1975-1987 time trend. 
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Table 5 – Bank branch expansion and entrepreneurship: Instrumental variables evidence 
 All municipalities  Municipalities included in the plans 
 Interaction terms 
specification  Trend break specification  
Interaction terms 
specification  Trend break specification 
 FE IV  FE IV  FE IV  FE IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) QN  0.49*** 5.32***  0.50*** 6.75***  0.98*** 5.00***  0.99*** 6.12** 
 (0.09) (1.31)  (0.09) (2.62)  (0.13) (1.30)  (0.13) (3.05) Q-YZ[ \ c?  1965f    0.04 -0.14     0.49*** 0.19 
    (0.06) (0.10)     (0.11) (0.21) Q-YZ[ \ h_-    -1.87*** -0.82     -4.38*** -3.13*** 
    (0.32) (0.56)     (0.59) (0.97) Q-YZ[ \ h_i    -0.26 0.13     -1.85*** -1.49** 
    (0.36) (0.42)     (0.66) (0.73) 
            
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Other controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
            
Number of municipalities 2,343 2,343  2,343 2,343  1,375 1,375  1,375 1,375 
Observations 28,116 28,116  28,116 28,116  16,500 16,500  16,500 16,500 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The dependent variable is the number of commercial licenses per 
capita in year t+1. The explanatory variable of interest is the cumulative number of new bank branches per capita opened since 1963. The other 
explanatory variables reported are bank branches per capita in the year 1963 interacted with (a) a 1965-1987 time trend, (b) a post-1971 dummy and 
(c) a post-1975 dummy. Other controls include population, telephones per capita (all measured in 1963) and enter the regression in the same way as 
branches per capita in 1963. The trend break specification also includes a 1965-1987 time trend, a post-1971 dummy interacted with a 1971-1987 time 
trend and a post-1975 dummy interacted with a 1975-1987 time trend. In the IV regressions of columns (2) and (6) the instruments are the number of 
bank branches per capita in the year 1963 interacted with the year-pair dummies. Table 2, columns (2) and (6) report the corresponding first-stage 
regressions. In the IV regressions of columns (4) and (8) the instruments are the number of bank branches per capita in the year 1963 interacted with 
a post 1971 time trend and a post 1975 time trend. Table 2, columns (4) and (8) report the corresponding first-stage regressions. 
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Table 6 – Bank branch expansion and entrepreneurship: Commercial banks vs. savings banks. Instrumental variables evidence 
 All municipalities  Municipalities included in the plans 
 Interaction terms 
specification  Trend break specification  
Interaction terms 
specification  Trend break specification 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) QN  commercial banks -6.82***   32.84   -3.52**   14.89  
 (1.90)   (23.37)   (1.55)   (33.14)  QN  savings banks  9.13***   8.47***   14.61***   6.26** 
  (1.37)   (3.21)   (2.01)   (3.08) 
            
Fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Other controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
            
Number of municipalities 2,343 2,343  2,343 2,343  1,375 1,375  1,375 1,375 
Observations 28,116 28,116  28,116 28,116  16,500 16,500  16,500 16,500 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The dependent variable is the number of commercial licenses per 
capita in year t+1. The explanatory variables of interest are the cumulative number of new commercial and savings bank branches per capita opened 
since 1963. All the regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and the following controls: number of inhabitants, telephones per capita (all 
measured in 1963) and enter the regression in the same way as branches per capita in 1963. The trend break specification also includes bank branches 
per capita in the year 1963 interacted with (a) a 1965-1987 time trend, (b) a post-1971 dummy and (c) a post-1975 dummy; a 1965-1987 time trend, a 
post-1971 dummy interacted with a 1971-1987 time trend and a post-1975 dummy interacted with a 1975-1987 time trend. In the IV regressions 
corresponding to the interaction terms specification (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6) the instruments are the number of bank branches per capita in the year 
1963 interacted with the year-pair dummies. In the IV regressions corresponding to the trend break specifications (columns 3, 4, 7 and 8) the 
instruments are the number of bank branches per capita in the year 1963 interacted with a post 1971 time trend and a post 1975 time trend. 
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Table 7 – Bank branch expansion and entrepreneurship: Instrumental variables evidence. Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (7) (4) (5) (6) QN  5.64*** 5.65*** 5.67*** 7.02*** 6.29*** 8.40*** 
 (1.32) (1.37) (1.31) (1.37) (1.39) (1.52) 
Regional plans 0.00***     0.00*** 
 (0.00)     (0.00) 
Per capita capital stock in education  0.01***    0.01*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Per capita capital stock in health   -0.02***   -0.01*** 
   (0.00)   (0.00) 
Per capita capital stock in toll highways    -0.00***  -0.00*** 
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
Per capita capital stock in other road infrastructure     -0.01*** -0.01*** 
     (0.00) (0.00) 
       
       
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Number of municipalities 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 2,343 
Observations 28,116 28,116 28,116 28,116 28,116 28,116 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The dependent variable is the number of commercial 
licenses per capita in year t+1. The explanatory variable of interest is the cumulative number of new bank branches per capita opened since 
1963. Other controls include population, telephones per capita (all measured in 1963) and enter the regression in the same way as branches 
per capita in 1963. The instruments are the number of bank branches per capita in the year 1963 interacted with the year-pair dummies. In all 
columns we run regressions based on the interaction terms specification of the form described in equation (13) 
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Appendix A 
Cancelling the term 
  
 from both sides of (6) and substituting the optimal  (from 
(4) for the unconstrained and from 
    1
 for the constrained) gives the 
following selection conditions:  
 
Selection condition 1 (unconstrained): 
  
 
  
    1
-, /12 (1A) 
 
- -,⁄ /12 -,⁄   /12- -,⁄ 
- -,⁄ 7 	 (2A) 
 
where (2A) can be written as  
 
 
 7 	
-, /12 1  ,- (3A) 
 
Selection condition 2 (constrained): 
  
 
  
    1
-, /12 (4A) 
 

    1
  
    1
 7 	
 (5A) 
 
where (5A) can be written as  
 
 
 7 	

    1
,  
    1
-, (6A) 
 
For notational convenience let’s define 
 
 p  	
-, /12 1  ,- (7A) 
 Q  
    1
-, /12 (8A) 
 q  	

    1
,  
    1
-, (9A) 
 
These two selection conditions imply that the individual will become an entrepreneur if 
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 p  
  Q (10A) 
Or 
 
 
 7 q	5>r	
  Q		 (11A) 
 
The threshold 8 that defines selection into entrepreneurship is given by the minimum value 
of  that meets these two inequalities. Since we are interested in how financial 
development affects selection into entrepreneurship we will study how 8 reacts to 
variations in .  
 
If p  Q condition one cannot hold, so only constrained individuals satisfying the second 
selection condition will become entrepreneurs and 8 is given by q. Notice that q is convex 
in   with a minimum at 
∗  -, -1 s*)*+.*  .*)*+.*. Evaluated at this minimum q∗ Q∗  p. Given that B is increasing in  while p simply does not depend on  we have 
that (i) for   ∗: p  Q and 8 is given by q and (ii) for   ∗: p M Q and 8 is given by p: 
 
 8
  tq						9			  

∗
p					9			  
∗  (12A) 
 
Notice that : 8
 :⁄ M 0 if and only if   
∗. In words, financial development only 
increases the propensity to start a business for individuals with   
∗. This inequality can 
only hold if 
∗  1 (because  7 1 by definition) or, what amounts to the same, if 
)*s* M -, -1. Intuitively, this means that only individuals with low liquid assets benefit from 
financial development. On the other hand, individuals with high liquid assets are 
unconstrained even in the absence of borrowing so financial development is irrelevant for 
them.  
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Appendix B 
All the variables used in the paper are taken from the Banesto Yearbooks except for the 
population variable which is drawn from the decennial Censuses from the INE (1960, 
1970, 1981 and 1991 censuses) and the province-level variables which come from the 
IVIE-BBVA Foundation. We use data drawn from the 1965 (the first available yearbook) 
to the 1993 yearbooks (the last available yearbook). Year t yearbooks generally report 
information relative to year t-2, but this is not always the case: on occasions, variables in 
the same yearbook are misaligned and refer to different years (Table A1 gives detailed 
information on the specific year each variable refers to in the different yearbooks). In order 
to build the panel, we first aligned information within yearbooks and made every variable 
from a year t yearbook refer to year t-2 (except for the 1991, 1992 and 1993 yearbooks 
which were used to create information for the year 1990). To fill in missing values we 
assumed constant yearly growth rates between two available years. For instance, to obtain 
the number of bank branches in 1980 we assumed a constant growth in the number of 
bank branches between 1979 and 1982 (Table A2 provides details on the exact provenance 
of each variable).  
 
Odd-year yearbooks cover municipalities with more than 3,000 inhabitants while even-year 
yearbooks cover municipalities with between 1,000 and 3,000 inhabitants (except for the 
last two available yearbooks that cover all the municipalities with more than 1,000 
inhabitants). Consecutive odd- and even-year yearbooks provide comprehensive 
information on the full spectrum of municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants. For 
this reason we pair the “aligned” yearbooks and let our time variable be a year-pair 
indicator standing for the years 1965-1966, 1966-1967, ..., 1987-1988 (a total of 12 panel 
periods).37 Information on the year-pair 1963-1964 is only used to construct some initial 
conditions such as the number of bank branches per capita in 1963-1964, the number of 
inhabitants in 1963-1964 and the number of telephones per capita in 1963-1964. To create 
the per capita variables we constructed a yearly population variable by assuming a constant 
yearly growth between any two censuses from the INE. 
 
[INSERT TABLES A1 AND A2] 
 
                                                          
37
 The 1990 information comes from the 1993 yearbook which covers all municipalities with more than 1,000 
inhabitants.  
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Appendix B Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. Description of the Banesto Yearbooks: year to which 
each variable corresponds in the different yearbooks. 
Yearbook 
Bank 
branches 
Savings 
bank 
branches 
Commercial 
licenses 
Telephones 
1965 1963 1963 1963 1963 
1966 1964 1964 1964 1964 
1967 1965 1965 1965 1965 
1968 1966 1966 1966 1966 
1969 1967 1967 1967 1967 
1970 1968 1968 1968 1968 
1971 1969 1969 1969 1969 
1972 1970 1970 1970 1970 
1973 1971 1971 1970 1971 
1974 1972 1972 1972 1972 
1975 1973 1973 1973 1973 
1976 1974 1974 1974 1974 
1977 1975 1975 1975 1975 
1978 1976 1976 1976 1976 
1979 1977 1977 1976 1976 
1980 1978 1978 1978 1978 
1981 1979 1979 1978 1978 
1982 1979 1980 1980 1980 
1983 1981 1982 1980 1981 
1984 1982 1982 1982 1982 
1985 1983 1984 1983 1983 
1986 1984 1984 1984 1984 
1987 1985 1985 1985 1985 
1988 1986 1986 1986 1986 
1989 1987 1987 1987 1987 
1990 1988 1988 1988 1988 
1991 1990 1990 1989 1990 
1992 1991 1991 1989 1991 
1993 1992 1992 1990 1992 
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Table A2.  Description of the “aligned yearbooks” 
Yearbook 
year 
Real 
year 
Number of commercial bank 
branches 
Number of savings bank 
branches 
Number of commercial 
licenses 
1965 1963 1965 yearbook 1965 yearbook 1965 yearbook 
1966 1964 1966 yearbook 1966 yearbook 1966 yearbook 
1967 1965 1967 yearbook 1967 yearbook 1967 yearbook 
1968 1966 1968 yearbook 1968 yearbook 1968 yearbook 
1969 1967 1969 yearbook 1969 yearbook 1969 yearbook 
1970 1968 1970 yearbook 1970 yearbook 1970 yearbook 
1971 1969 1971 yearbook 1971 yearbook 1971 yearbook 
1972 1970 1972 yearbook 1972 yearbook 1972 yearbook 
1973 1971 1973 yearbook 1973 yearbook 1973 and 1975 yearbooks (d)  
1974 1972 1974 yearbook 1974 yearbook 1974 yearbook 
1975 1973 1975 yearbook 1975 yearbook 1975 yearbook 
1976 1974 1976 yearbook 1976 yearbook 1976 yearbook 
1977 1975 1977 yearbook 1977 yearbook 1977 yearbook 
1978 1976 1978 yearbook 1978 yearbook 1978 yearbook 
1979 1977 1979 yearbook 1979 yearbook 1979 and 1981 yearbooks (e)  
1980 1978 1980 yearbook 1980 yearbook 1980 yearbook 
1981 1979 1981 yearbook 1981 yearbook 1981 and 1983 yearbooks (f) 
1982 1980 1982 and 1984 yearbooks (a)  1982 yearbook 1982 yearbook 
1983 1981 1983 yearbook 1981 and 1983 yearbooks (b)  1983 and 1985 yearbooks (g)  
1984 1982 1984 yearbook 1984 yearbook 1984 yearbook 
1985 1983 1985 yearbook 1985 and 1983 yearbooks (c)  1985 yearbook 
1986 1984 1986 yearbook 1986 yearbook 1986 yearbook 
1987 1985 1987 yearbook 1987 yearbook 1987 yearbook 
1988 1986 1988 yearbook 1988 yearbook 1988 yearbook 
1989 1987 1989 yearbook 1989 yearbook 1989 yearbook 
1990 1988 1990 yearbook 1990 yearbook 1990 yearbook 
Notes: The column “Real year” denotes the year every variable refers to in the aligned yearbooks (yearbook year-2).   
(a) 1980 commercial bank branches=1979 branches+(1982 branches-1979 branches)/3  
(b) 1981 savings bank branches=1979 branches+2*(1982 branches-1979 branches)/3 
(c) 1983 savings bank branches=1982 branches+(1984 branches-1982 branches)/2 
(d) 1971 commercial licenses=1970 licenses+(1973 licenses-1970 licenses)/3 
(e) 1977 commercial licenses=1976 licenses+(1978 licenses-1976 licenses)/2 
(f) 1979 commercial licenses=1978 licenses+(1980 licenses-1978 licenses)/2 
(g) 1981 commercial licenses=1980 licenses+(1983 licenses-1980 licenses)/3 
 
 
49
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011 
 
2011/1, Oppedisano, V; Turati, G.: "What are the causes of educational inequalities and of their evolution over time 
in Europe? Evidence from PISA" 
2011/2, Dahlberg, M; Edmark, K; Lundqvist, H.: "Ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution " 
2011/3, Canova, L.; Vaglio, A.: "Why do educated mothers matter? A model of parental help” 
2011/4, Delgado, F.J.; Lago-Peñas, S.; Mayor, M.: “On the determinants of local tax rates: new evidence from 
Spain” 
2011/5, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: “A model of music piracy with popularity-dependent copying costs” 
2011/6, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.; Parellada, M.: “Universities and regional economic growth in Spanish 
regions” 
2011/7, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.: “Do universities affect firms’ location decisions? Evidence from Spain” 
2011/8, Dahlberg, M.; Mörk, E.: “Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from 
election year effects” 
2011/9, Costas-Pérez, E.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: “Corruption scandals, press reporting, and 
accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors” 
2011/10, Choi, A.; Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: “Hell to touch the sky? private tutoring and academic achievement 
in Korea” 
2011/11, Mira Godinho, M.; Cartaxo, R.: “University patenting, licensing and technology transfer: how 
organizational context and available resources determine performance” 
2011/12, Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.; Montolio, D.: “The link between public support and private R&D 
effort: What is the optimal subsidy?” 
2011/13, Breuillé, M.L.; Duran-Vigneron, P.; Samson, A.L.: “To assemble to resemble? A study of tax disparities 
among French municipalities” 
2011/14, McCann, P.; Ortega-Argilés, R.: “Smart specialisation, regional growth and applications to EU cohesion 
policy” 
2011/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.: “Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications” 
2011/16, Pelegrín, A.; Bolancé, C.: “Offshoring and company characteristics: some evidence from the analysis of 
Spanish firm data” 
2011/17, Lin, C.: “Give me your wired and your highly skilled: measuring the impact of immigration policy on 
employers and shareholders”  
2011/18, Bianchini, L.; Revelli, F.: “Green polities: urban environmental performance and government popularity” 
2011/19, López Real, J.: “Family reunification or point-based immigration system? The case of the U.S. and 
Mexico” 
2011/20, Bogliacino, F.; Piva, M.; Vivarelli, M.: “The impact of R&D on employment in Europe: a firm-level 
analysis” 
2011/21, Tonello, M.: “Mechanisms of peer interactions between native and non-native students: rejection or 
integration?” 
2011/22, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Montolio, D.: “What type of innovative firms acquire knowledge 
intensive services and from which suppliers?” 
2011/23, Banal-Estañol, A.; Macho-Stadler, I.; Pérez-Castrillo, D.: “Research output from university-industry 
collaborative projects” 
2011/24, Ligthart, J.E.; Van Oudheusden, P.: “In government we trust: the role of fiscal decentralization” 
2011/25, Mongrain, S.; Wilson, J.D.: “Tax competition with heterogeneous capital mobility” 
2011/26, Caruso, R.; Costa, J.; Ricciuti, R.: “The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007” 
2011/27, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Local spending and the housing boom” 
2011/28, Simón, H.; Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.: “Occupational mobility of immigrants in a low skilled economy. The 
Spanish case” 
2011/29, Piolatto, A.; Trotin, G.: “Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory” 
2011/30, Montolio, D; Piolatto, A.: “Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns” 
2011/31, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Vivarelli, M.: “The determinants of YICs’ R&D activity” 
2011/32, Goodspeed, T.J.: “Corruption, accountability, and decentralization: theory and evidence from Mexico” 
2011/33, Pedraja, F.; Cordero, J.M.: “Analysis of alternative proposals to reform the Spanish intergovernmental 
transfer system for municipalities” 
2011/34, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Welfare spending and ethnic 
heterogeneity: evidence from a massive immigration wave” 
2011/35, Lyytikäinen, T.: “Tax competition among local governments: evidence from a property tax reform in 
Finland” 
2011/36, Brülhart, M.; Schmidheiny, K.: “Estimating the Rivalness of State-Level Inward FDI” 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011/37, García-Pérez, J.I.; Hidalgo-Hidalgo, M.; Robles-Zurita, J.A.: “Does grade retention affect achievement? 
Some evidence from Pisa” 
2011/38, Boffa, f.; Panzar. J.: “Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative” 
2011/39, González-Val, R.; Olmo, J.: “Growth in a cross-section of cities: location, increasing returns or random 
growth?” 
2011/40, Anesi, V.; De Donder, P.: “Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression” 
2011/41, Di Pietro, G.; Mora, T.: “The effect of the l’Aquila earthquake on labour market outcomes” 
2011/42, Brueckner, J.K.; Neumark, D.: “Beaches, sunshine, and public-sector pay: theory and evidence on 
amenities and rent extraction by government workers” 
2011/43, Cortés, D.: “Decentralization of government and contracting with the private sector” 
2011/44, Turati, G.; Montolio, D.; Piacenza, M.: “Fiscal decentralisation, private school funding, and students’ 
achievements. A tale from two Roman catholic countries” 
 
 
2012 
 
2012/1, Montolio, D.; Trujillo, E.: "What drives investment in telecommunications? The role of regulation, firms’ 
internationalization and market knowledge" 
2012/2, Giesen, K.; Suedekum, J.: "The size distribution across all “cities”: a unifying approach" 
2012/3, Foremny, D.; Riedel, N.: "Business taxes and the electoral cycle" 
2012/4, García-Estévez, J.; Duch-Brown, N.: "Student graduation: to what extent does university expenditure 
matter?" 
2012/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in 
tax enforcement" 
2012/6, Pickering, A.C.; Rockey, J.: "Ideology and the growth of US state government" 
2012/7, Vergolini, L.; Zanini, N.: "How does aid matter? The effect of financial aid on university enrolment 
decisions" 
2012/8, Backus, P.: "Gibrat’s law and legacy for non-profit organisations: a non-parametric analysis" 
2012/9, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Marín-López, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "What underlies localization and 
urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms" 
2012/10, Mantovani, A.; Vandekerckhove, J.: "The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in 
complementary markets" 
2012/11, Garcia-López, M.A.: "Urban spatial structure, suburbanization and transportation in Barcelona" 
2012/12, Revelli, F.: "Business taxation and economic performance in hierarchical government structures" 
2012/13, Arqué-Castells, P.; Mohnen, P.: "Sunk costs, extensive R&D subsidies and permanent inducement 
effects" 
2012/14, Boffa, F.; Piolatto, A.; Ponzetto, G.: "Centralization and accountability: theory and evidence from the 
Clean Air Act" 
2012/15, Cheshire, P.C.; Hilber, C.A.L.; Kaplanis, I.: "Land use regulation and productivity – land matters: 
evidence from a UK supermarket chain" 
2012/16, Choi, A.; Calero, J.: "The contribution of the disabled to the attainment of the Europe 2020 strategy 
headline targets" 
2012/17, Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "The ins and outs of unemployment in a two-tier labor market" 
2012/18, González-Val, R.; Lanaspa, L.; Sanz, F.: "New evidence on Gibrat’s law for cities" 
2012/19, Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Job search methods in times of crisis: native and immigrant strategies in Spain" 
2012/20, Lessmann, C.: "Regional inequality and decentralization – an empirical analysis" 
2012/21, Nuevo-Chiquero, A.: "Trends in shotgun marriages: the pill, the will or the cost?" 
2012/22, Piil Damm, A.: "Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: evidence from quasi-random 
neighborhood assignment of immigrants" 
2012/23, Ploeckl, F.: "Space, settlements, towns: the influence of geography and market access on settlement 
distribution and urbanization" 
2012/24, Algan, Y.; Hémet, C.; Laitin, D.: "Diversity and local public goods: a natural experiment with exogenous 
residential allocation" 
2012/25, Martinez, D.; Sjögren, T.: "Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes: how much difference does 
unemployment make?" 
2012/26, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat" 
2012/27, Andini, M.; De Blasio, G.; Duranton, G.; Strange, W.C.: "Marshallian labor market pooling: evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/28, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do political parties matter for local land use policies?" 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2012/29, Buonanno, P.; Durante, R.; Prarolo, G.; Vanin, P.: "Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the 
origins of the Sicilian mafia" 
2012/30, Anghel, B.; Cabrales, A.; Carro, J.M.: "Evaluating a bilingual education program in Spain: the impact 
beyond foreign language learning" 
2012/31, Curto-Grau, M.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers 
& state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain" 
2012/32, Kappeler, A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Stephan, A.; Välilä, T.: "Does fiscal decentralization foster regional 
investment in productive infrastructure?" 
2012/33, Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: "Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/34, Ramachandran, R.: "Language use in education and primary schooling attainment: evidence from a 
natural experiment in Ethiopia" 
2012/35, Rothstein, J.: "Teacher quality policy when supply matters" 
2012/36, Ahlfeldt, G.M.: "The hidden dimensions of urbanity" 
2012/37, Mora, T.; Gil, J.; Sicras-Mainar, A.: "The influence of BMI, obesity and overweight on medical costs: a 
panel data approach" 
2012/38, Pelegrín, A.; García-Quevedo, J.: "Which firms are involved in foreign vertical integration?" 
2012/39, Agasisti, T.; Longobardi, S.: "Inequality in education: can Italian disadvantaged students close the gap? A 
focus on resilience in the Italian school system" 
 
 
2013 
 
2013/1, Sánchez-Vidal, M.; González-Val, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Sequential city growth in the US: does age 
matter?" 
2013/2, Hortas Rico, M.: "Sprawl, blight and the role of urban containment policies. Evidence from US cities" 
2013/3, Lampón, J.F.; Cabanelas-Lorenzo, P-; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Why firms relocate their production overseas? 
The answer lies inside: corporate, logistic and technological determinants" 
2013/4, Montolio, D.; Planells, S.: "Does tourism boost criminal activity? Evidence from a top touristic country" 
2013/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Holl, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Suburbanization and highways: when the Romans, 
the Bourbons and the first cars still shape Spanish cities" 
2013/6, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Montolio, D.: "Should large Spanish municipalities be financially compensated? 
Costs and benefits of being a capital/central municipality" 
2013/7, Escardíbul, J.O.; Mora, T.: "Teacher gender and student performance in mathematics. Evidence from 
Catalonia" 
Cities and Innovation 
